On the surface the Copenhagen summit was about cutting carbon emissions, but the situation reminds me of Robin Hanson’s well known countrarian notion that politics is not about policy:
Civics teachers talk as if politics is about policy, that politics is our system for choosing policies to deal with common problems. But as Tyler Cowen suggests, real politics seems to be more about who will be our leaders, and what coalitions will rise or fall in status as a result.
By all accounts I’ve seen, Copenhagen marked the arrival of consensus regarding the general need to rein in carbon emissions, yet they couldn’t agree to endorse a formal statement or any substantially concrete targets.
Hugo Chavez made it quite explicit: climate change was merely a premise; he was there to negotiate against the capitalist system as a whole. Any successful agreement would be a de facto endorsement of US hegemony (or something like that — whatever rhetoric works):
“I would exhort the government and the people of the earth … to say that if the destructive nature of capitalism exists, let’s fight against it and make it obey us,” he said. “If capitalism resists, then we have to give battle against capitalism and open our way to save mankind.”
[Source: Toronto Star]
Even that’s merely a premise. What he is really trying to do (like any other leader), if we get right down to it, is acquire more personal attention and leverage by whatever means he possibly can. He makes the same case when he’s talking about economic trade, or anything at all; he even used the climate summit as a platform to accuse the US of military aggression.
Bottom line, the real negotiation is for political capital — for one’s country, but on some level it’s always personal too.
The US was there trying to demonstrate they’re still the dominant power in the world, and Obama was there to personally demonstrate he can get things done — an intention telegraphed by the language of his speech, e.g. “it is better for us to act than to talk; it’s better for us to choose action over inaction…”
Likewise, China was there trying demonstrate that they reserve the right to make their own decisions.
Common sense dictates they would be interested in limiting carbon emissions; their cities are literally choking on them. Based on a few references I’ve seen, China is aggressively working on innovations to address the issue. But they would be much less willing to look complacent and let the US, the EU, and the UN get credit for compelling them to change.
For the Guardian, Mark Lynas described his first-hand account in an article that will continue to make the rounds, “How do I know China wrecked the climate deal? I was in the room“:
To those who would blame Obama and rich countries in general, know this: it was China’s representative who insisted that industrialised country targets, previously agreed as an 80% cut by 2050, be taken out of the deal. “Why can’t we even mention our own targets?” demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia’s prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil’s representative too pointed out the illogicality of China’s position. Why should rich countries not announce even this unilateral cut? The Chinese delegate said no, and I watched, aghast, as Merkel threw up her hands in despair and conceded the point. Now we know why – because China bet, correctly, that Obama would get the blame for the Copenhagen accord’s lack of ambition.
It’s a very interesting article, sure to get a lot more attention, and indicative of how the prominent the US vs China narrative will probably be in the near future.
James Fallows responded to Lynas’s story by outlining a few points of reservation, but suggesting it seems important, if true:
even in a provisional sense, this seems worth noting as one strand in the emerging interpretation of China’s new role in international affairs, and the prospects for the much-bruited China-US cooperation on climate issues.
I could write in my sleep the response that will come from Chinese officials and from Chinese netizens about the unfairness of this view and the possibility that it will “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.”
The idea that progress on the climate front will have to come from bilateral agreement between the US and China also came up in a discussion on Charlie Rose (can’t find the permalink but the transcript is here).
Meanwhile, also in the mix we can observe optimistic statements by Ban Ki-moon being a way to sell the U.N. (and by extension, himself) as an important facilitator.
In all of these cases people are “negotiating” by posing as more capable than they are, and asking for more than they know they can possibly get, and generally trying to control the balance of information by artfully embellishing and obscuring their true intentions (perhaps even from themselves).
I’m using “negotiation” as a metaphor, but not entirely. I suspect that formal discipline of negotiation evolved from these tendencies.
As a final wrinkle (for now), consider how rallies on the streets can be interpreted as “negotiations” on yet another axis… another topic, perhaps, carrying on with the suggestion that what passes for theory is usually about theatre…
Climate change is not my area so I don’t presume to add anything to the discussion, per se. I’m doing this as part of a broader attempt to understand the 21st century, and even more generally, the meta factors and human fundamentals that affect these kinds of things, e.g. what we really talk about when we talk about power.
[Note: post was renamed the same day of publishing from "What exactly was being negotiated in Copenhagen?"]
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