Comments on: Metaphors For Work http://brianfrank.ca/2009/12/metaphors-for-work/ This is where I share my ideas & questions. Fri, 21 Oct 2011 19:39:24 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: What Innovation Gets You | Brian Frank http://brianfrank.ca/2009/12/metaphors-for-work/comment-page-1/#comment-6180 What Innovation Gets You | Brian Frank Thu, 17 Dec 2009 11:26:09 +0000 http://brianfrank.ca/?p=4698#comment-6180 [...] “Cargo Cult to Cluster Culture” post, and completely by chance, a few hours ago in a comment I linked to James’s classic chapter on the [...] [...] “Cargo Cult to Cluster Culture” post, and completely by chance, a few hours ago in a comment I linked to James’s classic chapter on the [...]

]]> By: Brian Frank http://brianfrank.ca/2009/12/metaphors-for-work/comment-page-1/#comment-6688 Brian Frank Thu, 17 Dec 2009 08:54:58 +0000 http://brianfrank.ca/?p=4698#comment-6688 I've been fairly persuaded by what I've read about Chomsky's ideas (via distillations by people like Pinker and Daniel Dennett). My understanding is that Lakoff's ideas are somewhat in conflict with Chomsky, though not in any way that matters to me. My interest is to know enough about how language works to self-evaluate and wring out possible fallacies from my thinking. My worry when studying linguistics in the continental tradition is that it seems to me like yet another degree of abstraction away from reality.<br><br>In this area I've been more persuaded by American pragmatists, specifically James, e.g. on <a href="http://books.google.ca/books?id=LouEf1OBiJcC&pg=PA426&lpg=PA426&dq=we+are+what+we+attend+to&source=bl&ots=AvJK-i1XwL&sig=xpz9xsqHGBpauvPvdzWudA2qABw&hl=en&ei=6KQpS6WVBYu_lAe-u8idBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAgQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q=we%20are%20what%20we%20attend%20to&f=false" rel="nofollow">attention</a>. Even Peirce gets too abstract for me, but I've found after wrestling with his semiotics I come away better equipped to address realities, whereas my experience with Heidegger, Lacan, Foucault, etc, is that I come away craving even more abstraction. I've been fairly persuaded by what I've read about Chomsky's ideas (via distillations by people like Pinker and Daniel Dennett). My understanding is that Lakoff's ideas are somewhat in conflict with Chomsky, though not in any way that matters to me. My interest is to know enough about how language works to self-evaluate and wring out possible fallacies from my thinking. My worry when studying linguistics in the continental tradition is that it seems to me like yet another degree of abstraction away from reality.

In this area I've been more persuaded by American pragmatists, specifically James, e.g. on attention. Even Peirce gets too abstract for me, but I've found after wrestling with his semiotics I come away better equipped to address realities, whereas my experience with Heidegger, Lacan, Foucault, etc, is that I come away craving even more abstraction.

]]> By: ndrwclrk http://brianfrank.ca/2009/12/metaphors-for-work/comment-page-1/#comment-6687 ndrwclrk Thu, 17 Dec 2009 07:33:38 +0000 http://brianfrank.ca/?p=4698#comment-6687 Yes, this is definitely related to your posts about the reification fallacy. The "things" we have words for are the "things" we think are real. The specific words that describe our experience actually shape it. It's sort of tied up in John Stuart Mill's quote: "everything which is usual appears natural". It's also related to the whole tradition of linguistic relativism, as per Sapir and Whorf, I think. All this type of thinking (as I understand the history of ideas) sort of went out of fashion with Chomsky, who proposed that we're all "innate" language processors, and it doesn't matter which langauge we use, or are exposed to. Many other traditions of thought would disagree with this, including some psychotherapeutic traditions that use languistic discipline to reshape thought, feeling and eventually one's sense of dasein (being-in-the-world). Yes, this is definitely related to your posts about the reification fallacy. The “things” we have words for are the “things” we think are real. The specific words that describe our experience actually shape it. It's sort of tied up in John Stuart Mill's quote: “everything which is usual appears natural”. It's also related to the whole tradition of linguistic relativism, as per Sapir and Whorf, I think. All this type of thinking (as I understand the history of ideas) sort of went out of fashion with Chomsky, who proposed that we're all “innate” language processors, and it doesn't matter which langauge we use, or are exposed to. Many other traditions of thought would disagree with this, including some psychotherapeutic traditions that use languistic discipline to reshape thought, feeling and eventually one's sense of dasein (being-in-the-world).

]]> By: Brian Frank http://brianfrank.ca/2009/12/metaphors-for-work/comment-page-1/#comment-6177 Brian Frank Thu, 17 Dec 2009 03:54:58 +0000 http://brianfrank.ca/?p=4698#comment-6177 I've been fairly persuaded by what I've read about Chomsky's ideas (via distillations by people like Pinker and Daniel Dennett). My understanding is that Lakoff's ideas are somewhat in conflict with Chomsky, though not in any way that matters to me. My interest is to know enough about how language works to self-evaluate and wring out possible fallacies from my thinking. My worry when studying linguistics in the continental tradition is that it seems to me like yet another degree of abstraction away from reality.<br><br>In this area I've been more persuaded by American pragmatists, specifically James, e.g. on <a href="http://books.google.ca/books?id=LouEf1OBiJcC&pg=PA426&lpg=PA426&dq=we+are+what+we+attend+to&source=bl&ots=AvJK-i1XwL&sig=xpz9xsqHGBpauvPvdzWudA2qABw&hl=en&ei=6KQpS6WVBYu_lAe-u8idBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAgQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q=we%20are%20what%20we%20attend%20to&f=false" rel="nofollow">attention</a>. Even Peirce gets too abstract for me, but I've found after wrestling with his semiotics I come away better equipped to address realities, whereas my experience with Heidegger, Lacan, Foucault, etc, is that I come away craving even more abstraction. I've been fairly persuaded by what I've read about Chomsky's ideas (via distillations by people like Pinker and Daniel Dennett). My understanding is that Lakoff's ideas are somewhat in conflict with Chomsky, though not in any way that matters to me. My interest is to know enough about how language works to self-evaluate and wring out possible fallacies from my thinking. My worry when studying linguistics in the continental tradition is that it seems to me like yet another degree of abstraction away from reality.

In this area I've been more persuaded by American pragmatists, specifically James, e.g. on attention. Even Peirce gets too abstract for me, but I've found after wrestling with his semiotics I come away better equipped to address realities, whereas my experience with Heidegger, Lacan, Foucault, etc, is that I come away craving even more abstraction.

]]> By: ndrwclrk http://brianfrank.ca/2009/12/metaphors-for-work/comment-page-1/#comment-6176 ndrwclrk Thu, 17 Dec 2009 02:33:38 +0000 http://brianfrank.ca/?p=4698#comment-6176 Yes, this is definitely related to your posts about the reification fallacy. The "things" we have words for are the "things" we think are real. The specific words that describe our experience actually shape it. It's sort of tied up in John Stuart Mill's quote: "everything which is usual appears natural". It's also related to the whole tradition of linguistic relativism, as per Sapir and Whorf, I think. All this type of thinking (as I understand the history of ideas) sort of went out of fashion with Chomsky, who proposed that we're all "innate" language processors, and it doesn't matter which langauge we use, or are exposed to. Many other traditions of thought would disagree with this, including some psychotherapeutic traditions that use languistic discipline to reshape thought, feeling and eventually one's sense of dasein (being-in-the-world). Yes, this is definitely related to your posts about the reification fallacy. The “things” we have words for are the “things” we think are real. The specific words that describe our experience actually shape it. It's sort of tied up in John Stuart Mill's quote: “everything which is usual appears natural”. It's also related to the whole tradition of linguistic relativism, as per Sapir and Whorf, I think. All this type of thinking (as I understand the history of ideas) sort of went out of fashion with Chomsky, who proposed that we're all “innate” language processors, and it doesn't matter which langauge we use, or are exposed to. Many other traditions of thought would disagree with this, including some psychotherapeutic traditions that use languistic discipline to reshape thought, feeling and eventually one's sense of dasein (being-in-the-world).

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